CIA's ambitious post-9/11 spy plan crumbles

The agency spent millions setting up front companies overseas to snag terrorists. Officials now say the bogus firms were ill-conceived and not close enough to Muslim enclaves.

The CIA set up a network of front companies in Europe and elsewhere after the Sept. 11 attacks as part of a constellation of "black stations" for a new generation of spies, according to current and former agency officials.

But after spending hundreds of millions of dollars setting up as many as 12 of the companies, the agency shut down all but two after concluding they were ill-conceived and poorly positioned for gathering intelligence on the CIA's principal targets : terrorist groups and unconventional weapons proliferation networks.

The closures were a blow to two of the CIA's most pressing priorities after the 2001 terrorist attacks: expanding its overseas presence and changing the way it deploys spies.

The companies were the centerpiece of an ambitious plan to increase the number of case officers sent overseas under what is known as "nonofficial cover," meaning they would pose as employees of investment banks, consulting firms or other fictitious enterprises with no apparent ties to the U.S. government.

But the plan became the source of significant dispute within the agency and was plagued with problems, officials said. The bogus companies were located far from Muslim enclaves in Europe and other targets. Their size raised concerns that one mistake would blow the cover of many agents. And because business travelers don't ordinarily come into contact with Al Qaeda or other high-priority adversaries, officials said, the cover didn't work.

Summing up what many considered the fatal flaw of the program, one former high-ranking CIA official said, "They were built on the theory of the 'Field of Dreams': Build them and the targets will come."

Officials said the experience reflected an ongoing struggle at the CIA to adapt to a new environment in espionage. The agency has sought to regroup by designing covers that would provide pretexts for spies to get close to radical Muslim groups, nuclear equipment manufacturers and other high-priority targets.

But current and former officials say progress has been painfully slow, and that the agency's efforts to alter its use of personal and corporate disguises have yet to produce a significant penetration of a terrorist or weapons proliferation network.

"I don't believe the intelligence community has made the fundamental shift in how it operates to adapt to the different targets that are out there," said Rep. Peter Hoekstra of Michigan, the top Republican on the House Intelligence Committee.

The cover arrangements most commonly employed by the CIA "don't get you near radical Islam," Hoekstra said, adding that six years after the attacks on New York and the Pentagon, "We don't have nearly the kind of penetrations I would have expected against hard targets."

 

Trying to get close

Whatever their cover, the CIA's spies are unlikely to single-handedly penetrate terrorist or proliferation groups, officials said. Instead, the agency stalks informants around the edges of such quarry -- moderate Muslims troubled by the radical message at their mosques ; mercenary shipping companies that might accept illicit nuclear components as cargo ; chemists whose colleagues have suspicious contacts with extremist groups.

Agency officials declined to respond to questions about the front companies and the decision to close them.

"Cover is designed to protect the officers and operations that protect America," CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano said. "The CIA does not, for that very compelling reason, publicly discuss cover in detail."

But senior CIA officials have publicly acknowledged that the agency has devoted considerable energy to creating new ways for its case officers -- the CIA's term for its overseas spies -- to operate under false identities.

"In terms of the collection of intelligence, there has been a great deal of emphasis for us to use nontraditional methods," CIA Director Michael V. Hayden said in November 2006 radio interview shortly after taking the helm at the agency. "For us that means nontraditional platforms -- what folks call 'out of embassy' platforms -- and we're progressing along those lines."

The vast majority of the CIA's spies traditionally have operated under what is known as official cover, meaning they pose as U.S. diplomats or employees of another government agency.

The approach has advantages, including diplomatic immunity, which means that an operative under official cover might get kicked out of a country if he or she is caught spying, but won't be imprisoned or executed.

Official cover is also cheaper and easier. Front companies can take a year or more to set up. They require renting office space, having staff to answer phones and paying for cars and other props. They also involve creating fictitious client lists and resumes that can withstand sustained scrutiny.

One of the CIA's commercial cover platforms was exposed in 2003 when undercover officer Valerie Plame was exposed in a newspaper by columnist Robert Novak. Public records quickly led to the unraveling of the company that served as her cover during overseas trips, a fictitious CIA firm called Brewster Jennings & Associates.

Official cover worked well for the duration of the Cold War, when holding a job at a U.S. Embassy enabled American spies to make contact with Soviet officials and other communist targets.

But many intelligence officials are convinced that embassy posts aren't useful against a new breed of adversaries. "Terrorists and weapons proliferators aren't going to be on the diplomatic cocktail circuit," said one government official familiar with the CIA's cover operations.

 

Under intense pressure

After the terrorist strikes, the Bush administration ordered the agency to expand its overseas operation by 50%. The agency came under intense pressure from Congress to alter its approach to designing cover and got a major boost in funding to expand the nonofficial cover program, which is commonly referred to by the acronym NOC, pronounced "knock."

Although the agency has used nonofficial cover throughout its history, the newer front companies were designed to operate on a different scale. Rather than setting up one- or two-person consulting firms, the plan called for the creation of companies that would employ six to nine case officers apiece, plus support staff.

The NOC program typically had functioned as an elite entity, made up of a small number of carefully selected case officers, some of whom would spend years in training and a decade or more overseas with only intermittent contact with headquarters. But the new plan called for the front companies to serve as way stations even for relatively inexperienced officers, who would be rotated in and out much the way they would in standard embassy assignments.

"The idea was that these were going to be almost like black stations," said a former CIA official involved in the plan to form the companies. "We were trying to build something that had a life span, that had durability."

In the process, the agency hoped to break a logjam in getting post-Sept. 11 recruits overseas. Thousands of applicants had rushed to join the CIA after the attacks, and many were sent to Afghanistan and Iraq. But outside of those war zones, open slots were scarce.

"The embassies were full," said a former CIA official involved in deployment decisions. "We were losing officers by the dozens because we didn't have slots for them overseas."

In separate interviews, two former CIA case officers who joined the agency after the attacks said that 15% to 20% of their classmates had quit within a few years. Among them, they said, was one who had earned his master's degree in business administration from Harvard University and was fluent in Chinese and another who had left a high-paying job at the investment firm Goldman Sachs.

The front companies were created between 2002 and 2004, officials said, and most were set up to look like consulting firms or other businesses designed to be deliberately bland enough to escape attention.

About half were set up in Europe, officials said -- in part to put the agency in better position to track radical Muslim groups there, but also because of the ease of travel and comfortable living conditions. That consideration vexed some CIA veterans.

"How do you let someone have a white-collar lifestyle and be part of the blue-collar terrorist infrastructure?" said one high-ranking official who was critical of the program.

But the plan was to use the companies solely as bases. Case officers were forbidden from conducting operations in the country where their company was located. Instead, they were expected to adopt second and sometimes third aliases before traveling to their targets. The companies, known as platforms, would then remain intact to serve as vessels for the next crop of case officers who would have different targets.

 

'A very bitter fight'

The concept triggered fierce debate within the agency, officials said.

"This was a very bitter fight," said a CIA official who was a proponent of the plan because it insulated the fictitious firms from the actual work of espionage.

"When you link the cover to the operation, the minute the operation starts getting dicey, you run across the screen of the local police, the local [intelligence service] or even the senior people in the mosque," the official said. "I saw this kill these platforms repeatedly. The CIA invests millions of dollars and then something goes wrong and it's gone."

But critics called the arrangement convoluted, and argued that whatever energy the agency was devoting to the creation of covers should be focused on platforms that could get U.S. spies close to their most important targets.

"How does a businessman contact a terrorist?" said a former CIA official involved in the decision to shut down the companies. "If you're out there selling widgets, why are you walking around a mosque in Hamburg ?"

Rather than random businesses, these officials said, the agency should be creating student aid organizations that work with Muslim students, or financial firms that associate with Arab investors.

Besides broad concerns about the approach, officials said there were other problems with the companies. Some questioned where they were located. One, for example, was set up in Portugal even though its principal targets were in North Africa.

The issue became so divisive that the agency's then-director, Porter J. Goss, tapped the official then in charge of the CIA's European division, Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, to lead an in-house review of the NOC strategy.

Mowatt-Larssen sided with critics of the approach and began pulling the plug on the companies before he left the agency to take a senior intelligence post at the Department of Energy, officials said. Mowatt-Larssen declined to comment.

The agency is in the midst of rolling out a series of new platforms that are more narrowly targeted, officials said. The External Operations and Cover Division has been placed under Eric Pound, a veteran foreign officer who was CIA station chief in Athens during the 2004 Olympics.

But the agency is still struggling to overcome obstacles, including resistance from many of the agency's station chiefs overseas, most of whom rose through the ranks under traditional cover assignments and regard the NOC program with suspicion and distrust.

In one recent case, officials said, the CIA's station chief in Saudi Arabia vetoed a plan to send a NOC officer who had spent years developing credentials in the nuclear field to an energy conference in Riyadh.

The NOC "had been invited to the conference, had seen a list of invitees and saw a target he had been trying to get to," said a former CIA official familiar with the matter. "The boss said, 'No, that's why we have case officers here.' "

Information relevée par LE FRONT ASYMÉTRIQUE

Source du texte : LOS ANGELES TIMES

Le Danemark veut des explications sur les avions de la CIA au Groenland

Le ministre danois des Affaires étrangères va demander des explications aux Etats-Unis sur de nombreuses escales d'avions de la CIA au Groenland, territoire danois d'outre-mer, révélées mercredi soir par un documentaire de la 1ère chaîne de télévision danoise, DR1.

Nucléaire iranien : Bush contredit par ses services secrets

Selon la direction nationale du renseignement, l'Iran a gelé son programme nucléaire militaire depuis 2003. Une analyse qui n'empêche pas le président américain d'adopter un ton alarmiste, constate le Washington Post.

En mettant en garde, cet automne, contre le risque de troisième guerre mondiale que représenterait un Iran doté d'armes nucléaires, le président Bush a alarmé le monde entier. Mais il a lancé ce sévère avertissement au moins un mois, voire deux, après qu'il eut pris connaissance de l'existence d'indices d'une suspension effective du programme nucléaire militaire iranien. Le nouveau rapport de la direction nationale du renseignement – qui regroupe les seize agences d'espionnage américaines –, rendu public le 3 décembre, non seulement dément le discours alarmiste du gouvernement sur les ambitions nucléaires de Téhéran, mais pourrait saper les efforts de Bush visant à obtenir la prise de nouvelles sanctions internationales contre l'Iran. Enfin, le nouveau rapport pourrait bien rendre impossible toute action militaire préventive avant le départ de Bush de la Maison-Blanche.

L'Iran est devenu le sujet central de la politique étrangère américaine de la fin de mandat de Bush et de la campagne électorale pour désigner son successeur. Dirigeants américains et étrangers doivent maintenant revoir ce qu'ils pensaient savoir des intentions et des capacités de Téhéran. A Washington, certains se sont emparés du rapport pour fustiger ce que le candidat démocrate à la présidence John Edwards a appelé "l'empressement de George Bush et de Dick Cheney à entrer en guerre avec l'Iran". Mais la Maison-Blanche, de son côté, a affirmé que le rapport venait étayer ses craintes en confirmant que l'Iran avait effectivement entamé un programme d'armes nucléaires avant d'y mettre un terme en 2003 sous la pression diplomatique exercée par les Etats-Unis. "Tout compte fait, le rapport apporte une bonne nouvelle", a déclaré le conseiller à la sécurité nationale Stephen Hadley. "D'un côté, il nous donne raison, pour nous être inquiétés de la volonté de Téhéran de mettre au point des armes nucléaires. De l'autre, il nous conforte dans nos efforts pour empêcher cette éventualité, puisque, grâce à nous, des progrès ont été effectué dans ce sens". Le rapport emploie un langage qui permet au gouvernement américain de crier victoire, notent certains analystes. L'information sur l'arrêt du programme d'armement nucléaire iranien est "sensationnelle", estime Paul Pillar, un ancien haut responsable de la CIA, qui s'est montré critique envers Bush durant la période précédant la guerre avec l'Irak, mais "le président peut prétendre que l'Iran s'y est résolu durant son mandat et que cela représente un succès pour lui. Et il a de bonnes raisons de le faire".

Il n'empêche, le gouvernement avait compris à quel point les nouvelles conclusions du rapport pouvaient se révéler explosives, et il s'est évertué à les garder secrètes. Selon Stephen Hadley, Bush a été informé pour la première fois au mois d'août ou au mois de septembre que les agences de renseignement estimaient que l'Iran avait suspendu son programme nucléaire militaire, mais il a également été informé qu'il fallait encore un peu de temps pour analyser la situation. Le vice-président Dick Cheney, Stephen Hadley et d'autres hauts responsables ont quant à eux été mis au courant il y a deux semaines. Les services de renseignement ont finalement formalisé leurs conclusions le 3 décembre avant de les soumettre au président. 

A Washington, des modérés craignent que le nouveau rapport, comme d'autres avant lui, ne fasse l'objet d'une interprétation biaisée. Pour le député démocrate de Californie Brad Sherman, président du sous-comité sur la non-prolifération nucléaire de la Commission des affaires étrangères de la Chambre des représentants, le fait que l'Iran continue d'enrichir de l'uranium reste préoccupant, et n'a rien à voir avec les services de renseignement américains, parce que Téhéran ne s'en est jamais caché. Le vrai enseignement à tirer du rapport, selon lui, est la nécessité de rééquilibrer la politique américaine en recourant davantage aux leviers diplomatiques et économiques. "C'est la validation de la voie du milieu, entre aller se coucher… et la stratégie du 'bombardons-les tout de suite'."

Source du texte : COURRIER INTERNATIONAL / WASHINGTON POST

Les services secrets de Sa Majesté recrutent

Envie de goûter à la vie de James Bond ? Le MI6, qui cherche à élargir ses rangs, a lancé une campagne de publicité sur la radio BBC.

Vous avez toujours rêvé de troquer votre nom pour une matricule en 00 ? C’est donc le moment pour vous de postuler. Les services secrets britanniques ont lancé cette semaine, sur le canal 1 de la BBC, une série de spots publicitaires destinés à recruter davantage d’agents.

D’après un officiel cité par The Guardian, le MI6 souhaite "renforcer ses équipes" et "mieux refléter la diversité ethnique de la communauté" pour laquelle les services secrets travaillent. Tout au long de la semaine donc, les auditeurs de la BBC pourront écouter une série de témoignages d’agents en opération. Mardi, « Greg » raconte la fin de sa formation d’espion. Mercredi, les journalistes exploreront le service de contre-terrorisme. Pour des raisons de sécurité, les voix de ces espions ont été brouillées.

"Actuellement il y a une image erronée qui est véhiculée autour des missions des services secrets", a expliqué sur Radio 1 le responsable du recrutement du MI6, présenté sous le pseudo "Mark". "Il y a un fossé entre la réalité du terrain et la fiction présentée dans James Bond. Toutefois il arrive parfois que cet écart se rétrécisse ce qui garantit au candidat une carrière pleine de rebondissements", a-t-il expliqué. Le site du MI6 ne précise pas combien d’agents seront recrutés. L’institution emploierait actuellement environ 2.000 personnes.

Ce n’est pas la première fois que les services secrets britanniques tombent le masque pour faire découvrir au grand public l’intérieur de l’enseigne. Il y a un an, à l’occasion de la sortie de "Casino Royale", le dernier épisode des aventures de James Bond, le MI6 avait autorisé deux de ses agents à témoigner au micro de Colin Murray, un des animateurs vedettes de la BBC.

Plusieurs profils sont recherchés mais ceux qui parlent des langues étrangères comme l’arabe, le persan, l’urdu, le chinois ou encore l’espagnol sont particulièrement demandés. Vous pouvez déjà vous exercer aux tests de sélection. Le MI6 a mis à disposition des internautes une mise en situation qui vous permettra d’évaluer vos talents d’espion…

Exode des agents secrets de Sa Majesté

C'est le grand malaise de l'armée britannique. Près de 20% des officiers qui travaillent pour les services de renseignements de l'armée ont quitté leurs fonctions ces trois dernières années, selon une source militaire citée hier par le Daily Telegraph.

Les espionnes marocaines du Mossad

Les services secrets israéliens recrutent leurs agents parmi des Marocaines, particulièrement douées et efficaces.

Teint doré, petite coupe à la garçonne, look exotic-chic, yeux pétillants, regard charmeur, démarche gracieuse et élocution parfaite. Sous ses airs légers et désinvoltes de métropolitaine bien dans sa peau, Nabila F., la quarantaine épanouie, cache remarquablement son jeu. 

Nabila est, comme on l'appelle dans le jargon du renseignement, un officier traitant. C'est ce qui ressort des révélations d'une certaine Jocelyne Baini, sur le site www.doubtcom.com. (Note de Theatrum Belli : le site semble ne plus être activé).